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SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION

Local Government Litigation:
Some Pivotal Principles
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The legal sage, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once observed that "[flacts
do not often exactly repeat themselves in practice; but cases with
comparatively small variations from each other do."1 Although Holmes
employed the observation in a specific litigation context,2 his insight

* Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. University of Georgia
(A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 124 (1881).
2. Students of tort law (and whom among us is not?) will fondly remember Holmes's
employment of the observation in urging a larger role for the trial judge in negligence
cases. They will recall that some forty-six years after espousing this development, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. put the principle into play via his famous decision of Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927). Seven years later, the Supreme Court
(per Justice Cardozo) purported to "limit" the Goodman principle in the case of Pokora v.
Wabash Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
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obviously possesses a broader relevance. At other junctures as well, that
is to say, law's continuity bears emphasis as a fundamental feature of
complete juridical synthesis.
This notion may initially appear unpersuasive in particular settings.
In the pervasive realm of local government law, for example, novel issues
continually confront the appellate courts with daunting questions of first
impression. In that sphere, and peculiarly so, the tensions are intensely
personal. There, the community's increasingly encroaching collectivism
threatens the individual's perceptively receding uniqueness in matters
unparalleled at other governmental levels. The conflicts are further
fueled, moreover, by the sheer numbers of overlapping entities in the
local government complex, each advancing its own jurisdictional cause.
The nature of the beast, therefore, seemingly bodes discouragingly for
any semblance of a recurring legal "order."
The appearance is, however, somewhat deceiving. For in local
government litigation as well, it turns out, what goes around comes
around. Even there, the present frequently, and undeniably, reflects the
past. Particular principles work themselves into the evolving legal
corpus; they assume pivotal status as analytical points of departure.
They are the principles of "go to" significance when foundational conflicts
arise; they are the principles that must be applied, distinguished,
rejected, or ignored in moving to resolution.
The phenomenon periodically manifests itself to a degree deserving
attention from those who appreciate case law's historical component.
This brief account seeks to provide illustrative focus. It assembles a
small assortment of modern instances in which Georgia's appellate
courts retreat to the past to craft for the future. Thereby, the instances
reconfirm the enduring nature of "pivotal" legal principles. Although by
no means unfolding a "seamless web," the episodes do portray local
government litigation's pulsating character of continuity.
II.

VIGNETES OF CONTINUITY

As indicated, the epochs of illustration are scattered throughout the
corpus of Georgia local government law. Aside from the point in
emphasis, they possess little else in common. Each, however, represents
a tile in the mosaic here under scrutiny-a mosaic of litigational
continuity. Each selected principle requires a brief sketch of both origin
and modern sighting.
A.

Reapportionmentand Local Government

1. Background. By 1964 the United States Supreme Court had
virtually completed evolution of its "one person, one vote" requirement
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for both Congress and state legislatures.3 Three more years elapsed,
however, before the Court considered the principle's applicability to local
governments.4 Even then, moreover, the Court rendered three decisions
in rapid-fire succession, expressly refusing to declare applicability5 and
postponing the inevitable by yet one additional year.6 The Supreme
Court thus approached local government reapportionment via a reversal
of the normal order: It first declared exceptions and only later adopted
the requirement.7
Perhaps the most interesting of the exceptions emerged from the
Court's 1967 decision in Sailors v.Kent County Board of Education,8
involving the membership of a Michigan county school board.9 The
challenged system featured a procedure under which the people of each
unequally populated county district elected their district's school board.
Subsequently, delegates from the district boards met biennially to elect
a county school board. Plaintiffs alleged that the second election (by the
delegates from the unequal districts) constituted discrimination and
violated the one person, one vote requirement. ° A divided three-judge

3. This occurred in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) and its companion cases:
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Commission for FairRepresentation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock,
377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713
(1964).
4. For treatment of the local government reapportionment cases during these three
years in both the state and federal courts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reapportionment and
Local Government, 1 GA. L. REV. 596 (1967), reprinted in R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STUDIES
IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (3d ed. 1977).
5. Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 104 (1967); Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 111
(1967); Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 114 (1967). For treatment of these cases, see Sentell,
supra note 4, at 604, 632, 636.
6. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 479 (1968). For treatment of this case, see
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Avery v. Midland County: Reapportionment and Local Government
Revisited, 3 GA. L. REV. 110 (1968), reprinted in R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN
GEORGIA LOcAL GOVERNMENT LAw 61 (3d ed. 1977).
7. See Moody, 387 U.S. at 104; Sailors, 387 U.S. at 111; Dusch, 387 U.S. at 114;
Avery, 390 U.S. at 479.
8. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
9. "No constitutional question is presented as respects those elections." Id. at 106.
10. Id. at 106-07.
The alleged constitutional questions arise when it comes to the county school
board. It is chosen, not by the electors of the county, but by delegates from the
local boards. Each board sends a delegate to a biennial meeting and those
delegates elect a county board of five members, who need not be members of the
local boards, from candidates nominated by school electors.
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district court dismissed
plaintiffs' action, 1 and the Supreme Court
12
affirmed the dismissal.
The Court's opinion initially struck the note of a conditional assumption. 3 Even assuming the equal-population mandate's applicability to
elective local officials, 4 the Court denied the precept's relevance to an
appointive process. 15 That point augured pivotal to the case, for "[t]he
Michigan system for selecting members of the county school board is
basically appointive rather than elective." 6
Secondly, the Court
deemed the appointive process completely appropriate for "administrative" officials." That point likewise proved decisive, for the county
school board "performs essentially administrative functions; and while
they are important, they are not legislative in the classical sense." 5
Accordingly, the Court concluded, "[slince the choice of members of the
county school board did not involve an election and since none was
required for these nonlegislative offices, the principle of 'one man, one
vote' has no relevancy."19

11. Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 254 F. Supp. 17, 17-29 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
12. Sailors, 387 U.S. 111.
13. Justice Douglas wrote the Court's opinion, with Justices Harlan and Stewart
concurring in the result but without separate opinions. Id. at 106, 111.
14.
If we assume arguendo that where a State provides for an election of a local
official or agency, the [equal population] requirements ... must be met, we are
still short of an answer to the present problem and that is whether Michigan may
allow its county school boards to be appointed.
Id. at 109.
15. Id. at 109-110.
16. Id.
The delegates from the local school boards, not the school electors, select the
members of the county school board. While the school electors elect the members
of the local school boards and the local school boards, in turn, select delegates to
attend the meeting at which the county board is selected, the delegates need not
cast their votes in accord with the expressed preferences of the school electors
....
It is evident, therefore, that the membership of the county board is not
determined, directly or indirectly, through an election in which the residents of the
county participate.
Id. at 109-10 n.6.
17. Id. at 111. The Court expressly reserved the question of "whether a State may
constitute a local legislative body through the appointive rather than the elective process."
Id. at 109-10.
18. Id. at 110. Rather than discussing any tests by which "administrative functions"
were so classified, the Court simply listed the powers possessed by the Michigan county
school board: appointing school superintendents, preparing budgets, levying taxes,
distributing delinquent taxes, employing teachers, establishing schools for children in
juvenile homes, and transferring areas from one school district to another. Id. at 110 n.7.
19. Id. at 111.
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Exuding its "exceptions before the rule" approach to local government
reapportionment, the Supreme Court's treatment of Sailors-both its
omissions and commissions-raised intriguing points for ponder. The
"omissions," from several perspectives, counseled caution in hasty
appraisal. For instance, the Court in Sailors did not impose the equal
population requirement generally upon local governments. Nor did the
Court expressly declare the requirement applicable to "elective" local
government officials. Nor did the Court permit a state's evasion of the
mandate by selecting local "legislative" officials via an "appointive"
process. Nor did the Court tender more than the sketchiest rationale for
distinguishing "elective" and "appointive" local offices. Nor did the Court
proffer even an analytical hint for classifying "legislative" and "administrative" functions. As for its "commissions," the Court in Sailors seized
upon two primary facets of modification. ° First, it approved employment of an "appointment" process for selecting an "administrative" local
government official. 2 Second, the Court worked an exemption of that
"appointed" "administrative" official from the "one person, one vote"
requirement.22 With Sailors, therefore, the Supreme Court crafted an
"exception" of indefinite dimensions, an uncertain previous restraint
upon the Court's subsequently declared "rule" of local government
reapportionment.
2. Recent Sighting. Over the years following the United States
Supreme Court's initial confrontations with local government apportionment, the issue received virtually no attention from the Georgia
courts.2" This fact, of course, constituted no cause for inordinate
surprise. With federal rights and responsibilities commonly considered
consigned to the federal judiciary, the matter of legislative representation was not one ordinarily anticipated for state court dispensation.
Rare occasions, nevertheless, provoked tantalizing reflections. In 1976
the Georgia Supreme Court considered the case of Rich v. State,24 a
multi-faceted constitutional challenge to a state authority established to
promote low income housing.2 5 The creating statute provided for a

20. Id. at 109-11.
21. Id. at 111.
22. Id.
23. This is not to indicate that matters of Georgia local government voting representation were not actively considered in the federal courts. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
24. 237 Ga. 291, 227 S.E.2d 761 (1976).
25. Id. at 291, 227 S.E.2d at 763. The authority sought to issue revenue bonds thereby
drawing plaintiffs challenge as an intervenor. Id.

6
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membership consisting of four state officials and two public appointees.26 That membership afforded lesser populated areas and businesses
disproportionate representation,
plaintiff charged, urging a violation of
"one person, one vote."27 In response, a unanimous supreme court
disposed of plaintiff's position with a single sentence: "It is clear from
Sailors v. Board of Education

.

. . that the one-man, one-vote mandate

of the Constitution applies only to elected officials, and is thus inappropriate where, as here, members of a clearly administrative authority are
appointed."" In this fashion, therefore, focusing both upon the entity's
"administrative" nature and its "appointive" selection, the court brought
the Sailors exception into play. What the federal courts had evolved for
local governments, the Georgia court thus extended to the state
authority.
Aside from the most minimal of blips, Georgia's judicial radar screen
thereafter remained clear. Local government apportionment savored of
the distant past, the matter had received settled resolution, and the
issue remained at rest.
Not so. Bursting onto the modern scene, Ramsbottom Co. v.
Bass/Zebulon Roads Neighborhood Ass'n29 unsealed local government
apportionment history. The case brought to litigation the method
employed for selecting members of a municipal-county joint planning and
zoning commission.3" A joint municipal-county ordinance created the
commission as a body of five county residents, three of whom must be
city residents as well. 3 Further, "[tihe City and County governing
bodies alternate[d] appointing a Commission member for a five-year
term, with one position turning over each year."32 Challengers maintained that the process disproportionately favored the municipality, and
the trial judge declared the ordinance in violation of "one person, one
vote."33 The Georgia Supreme Court granted discretionary appeal.34

26. The two public members were appointed by the Governor with the state senate's
confirmation. Id. at 295-96, 227 S.E.2d at 766.
27. Id. at 297, 227 S.E.2d at 766.
28. Id., 227 S.E.2d at 767.
29. 273 Ga. 798, 546 S.E.2d 778 (2001).
30. Id. at 798, 546 S.E.2d at 779. The case arose as a result of the zoning commission's
approval of a rezoning proposal. Plaintiffs challenged both the approval and the method
of selecting commission members. Id.
31. Id. at 799, 546 S.E.2d at 779. "Other than the residency requirement, there are no
other restrictions set forth in the ordinance regarding qualifications to serve as a
Commission member and appointment lies within the discretion of each appointing body."
Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 799, 801, 546 S.E.2d at 779.
34. Id. at 798, 546 S.E.2d at 779.
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A unanimous supreme court reversed the trial court's decision.35 In
an opinion of analytical contrasts, the court stamped its imprimatur
upon the legacy of Sailors. On the one hand, the court posited, the "true
nature" of the challenged selection process was "definitely appointive."36
Just as in Sailors, the zoning commission's membership "'is not
determined, directly or indirectly, through an election in which the
residents of the county participate.'"3 7 On the other hand, the court
paid far less deference to Sailors's additional point of emphasis, i.e.,
limiting the "appointment" process to officials who perform "essentially
administrative functions."38 In justification of the deviation, the court
explained that plaintiffs in Ramsbottom challenged only the ordinance
creating the zoning commission; they failed to challenge the local
constitutional amendment authorizing that ordinance. 9 The failure
proved fatal, the court reasoned, because it was that amendment that
"represents the State's choice to allow the Commission to be selected by
appointment rather than election."4 ° With that "choice" going unchallenged in the case, the court subscribed to language from a New York
federal case:4 "[Once it is determined that the members . . . are not
selected by popular election, there is no need to determine whether they
perform functions that may be better defined as 'legislative' or 'administrative.' 4 2 Bringing that expression to bear in Ramsbottom,43 the

35. Id. at 801, 546 S.E.2d at 781.
36. Id., 546 S.E.2d at 780.
37. Id. (quoting Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110 n.6).
38. Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110.
39. 273 Ga. at 799, 546 S.E.2d at 779. That provision "authorized the two governing
authorities to 'promulgate zoning or planning laws .... and administer the same, and/or
appoint agencies or agency for adopting zoning and planning laws, rules, and regulations,
and for administering the same. . .

.'"

Id. (quoting 1947 Ga. Laws 1240).

40. Id. Plaintiffs "raised no constitutional challenge to Ga. L. 1947, p. 1240, which
represents the State's choice to allow the Commission to be selected by appointment rather
than election. Instead, [plaintiffs] challenge only the provisions of the joint ordinance
regarding the criteria for filling the appointed positions." Id.
41. Id. at 800, 546 S.E.2d at 780; Rosenthal v. Bd. of Educ., 385 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y.
1974), affd without opinion, 420 U.S. 987 (1975).
42. 273 Ga. at 800, 546 S.E.2d at 780 (quoting Rosenthal, 385 F. Supp. at 226).
43. The court employed the same approach to escape the Supreme Court's language in
Hadley v. Junior College District,397 U.S. 50 (1970), declaring the "one person, one vote"
principle applicable "whenever a state or local government decides to select persons by
popular election to perform governmental functions .... " Id. at 56. The court in
Ramsbottom stated, "[We need not decide here whether this Court's recognition of the
Commission's unique creation and the legislative functions it performs, which distinguishes
it from other statutorily-constituted zoning commissions ... means that the Commission
performs 'governmental functions.'" 273 Ga. at 800-01, 546 S.E.2d at 780 (citation
omitted).
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court held that "the one person, one vote principle is not applicable to
the [municipal-county zoning] Commission."'
3. Reflection. Lying virtually dormant for more than one-third of
a century, the issue of apportionment suddenly surged to prominence in
Georgia local government litigation. Confronted with that issue, the
Georgia Supreme Court found itself immersed in principles federally
fashioned in the mid-1960s and receiving scant additional attention since
that time. Those principles, themselves intriguingly crafted as exceptions
before the rule, yielded only imperfectly to present requirements, forcing
the court further afield for resolution.
In deciding Ramsbottom, the Georgia Supreme Court reverted
specifically to the United States Supreme Court's 1967 resolution of
Sailors v. Board of Education."' Finding the Sailors's exception to offer
the desired result, the Georgia court struggled with Ramsbottom's
factual deviations.46 The court's analytical exercise seized upon the
zoning commission's "unique" creation, as well as the challengers' failure
expressly to question that creation.47 The emerging and uncontested
"state choice" enabled the court to avoid Sailors's deviations and yet
embrace its result. Accordingly, the local government's planning and
zoning commission escaped the rule of reapportionment and survived by
way of the "appointment" exception."
In the "law" of local government apportionment, both the historical
background and the modern confrontation offer much for reflection and
debate. The episode's intrigue, however, derives simply from the
example provided for witnessing pivotal principles from "the past," some
thirty-four years in retrospect, "retouched."
B.

Local Government's Protectionfrom the State

1. Background. The history of American local government is in
large part the history of the state-local government relationship.4 9
Indeed, local government law owes its genesis to the eternal tensions
inherent in that relationship.5" Those tensions found early manifestation through a doctrinal standoff between two of America's most famous

44. 273 Ga. at 801, 546 S.E.2d at 780.
45. Id. at 800, 801, 546 S.E.2d at 780.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 799, 801, 546 S.E.2d at 779-80.
48. Id. at 801, 546 S.E.2d at 780.
49. See the discussion in R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Home Rule System, 50
MERCER L. REV. 99 (1998).
50. Id.
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legal figures. Of one persuasion, Judge Thomas M. Cooley proclaimed
the existence of an "inherent right" of local self-government, an "absolute
right" independent of state legislative control."1 In opposition, Judge
John Dillon denied local governments any autonomy, declaring that all
their powers necessarily derived from and controlled by state legislatures.5 2
Dillon's eventual triumph over Cooley's inherent right theory solidified
the precept of "plenary" state legislative power."3 Under that precept,
the local government exists as a mere creature of the state, dependent
upon the state legislature for any powers possessed or exercised.5 4 This
"creature concept" also serves to limit the local government's capacity to
protest perceived mistreatment by the state.5 5 In several respects, it
was established early that the "creature" lacked legal standing to claim
constitutional protection from the "creator.""

51. Judge Cooley is commonly said to have staked out his position via a concurring
opinion in a Michigan case, LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 92 (1871) (Cooley, J.,
concurring). For the strongest academic support accorded the inherent right theory, see
I EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 246 (1911).
52. I JOHN DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (1872). As Dillon reasoned,
[i]t is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and no others: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessarilyor fairly implied in, or incident
to, the powers expressly granted; third, those essentialto the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable.
Id. For the strongest academic rejection of the inherent right theory, see Howard L.
McBain, The Doctrineof an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REV.
299 (1916).
53. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, et al., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A
FEDERAL SYSTEM 37 (4th ed. 1996) ("The doctrine of plenary state legislative power means
that the state legislature possesses full authority to provide for the organization and
allocation of power to local government units").
54. See, e.g., OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 75
(1982), which states:
[M]unicipalities in the United States are subject to the complete control of the
states in which they are located except as such control is limited by constitutional
provisions. State control of cities and towns has been described as "plenary."...
Thus, the state may take away the powers of municipalities, may transfer their
functions to other governmental units, and may turn their property over to other
governmental entities without making compensation.
Id. (citations omitted).
55. For discussion, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., When A Mother Hurts Her Young: Local
Government ConstitutionalProtection Against the State (Part ), URBAN GA. MAG., May
1981, at 31 and R. Perry Sentell, Jr., When A Mother Hurts Her Young: Local Government
ConstitutionalProtection Against the State (PartII), URBAN GA. MAG., June 1981, at 33,
reprintedin R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., ADDITIONAL STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW 1 (1983).
56. See generally sources cited supra note 55.

10
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The United States Supreme Court weighed in upon the issue in a
fairly decisive fashion. By its famous 1923 decision in City of Trenton
v. New Jersey,5 7 the Court denied municipal power to protest the state's
taking of city property without due process of law.5" There, the Court
characterized the municipality as "a political subdivision of the State,
created as a convenient agency for the exercise of such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to it."5 9 Accordingly, the
city possessed no federal due process protection against the State's
imposition of a controverted fee.6" In a companion case, City of Newark
v.New Jersey, 1 the Court extended the precept to equal protection as
well.62 The regulation of municipalities fell "peculiarly within the
domain of the State;"6 that regulation stood beyond the city's challenge
founded upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.64
A decade later, Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore65
tested the Court with a city's attack upon a state statute exempting a
railroad from municipal taxation.66 Rejecting the challenge, a unanimous Supreme Court left no doubt on the issue.6 7 "A municipal
corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has
no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may
invoke in opposition to the will of its creator.""
The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Williams found almost
immediate acceptance in the local government law of Georgia. Ellington
Co. v. City of Macon69 featured a municipal challenge to a statute

57. 262 U.S. 182 (1923).
58. Id. at 188. The municipality sought to challenge a state fee imposed for the city's
diversion of water from streams. Id. at 183.
59. Id. at 185-86.
60. Id. at 192. "[Tlhe City cannot invoke these provisions of the Federal Constitution
against the imposition of the license fee or charge for diversion of water specified in the
state law here in question." Id.
61. 262 U.S. 192 (1923).
62. Id. at 196.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. 289 U.S. 36 (1933).
66. Id. at 37.
67. Id. at 40.
68. Id. Thus, the Court concluded, "[tihere is error in the holding of the [lower court]
that the statute of Maryland creating this exemption is a denial to the respondents of the
equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States." Id.
69. 177 Ga. 541, 170 S.E. 813 (1933).
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prohibiting local governments from taxing motor common carriers.7 °
The city attacked the statute as "contrary to the equal protection clauses
of the State and Federal constitutions."7 Rebuffing the city's position,
the Georgia court first quoted Williams on a local government's
impotency under the federal constitution to assert privileges or
immunities against the state.7 2 "The same principle," the Georgia
Supreme Court posited, "would be applicable as to provisions of the State
constitution."73
Over intervening years, the supreme court reiterated its approach in
Ellington Co. and, on occasion, rejected efforts to broaden that approach.
By 1978 the court was prepared to restate both the principle and its
exceptions. City of Atlanta v. Spence74 presented the city's constitutional challenge to a general statute terminating the municipality's
exemption from county property taxes.7 5 Treating defendant's lack-ofstanding argument, the court fashioned a litigational line of demarcation. 76 First, the court adumbrated the principle: "A county or municipal corporation, created by the legislature, does not have standing to
invoke the equal protection and due process clauses of the State or
Federal Constitution in opposition to the will of its creator."77 Second,
the court indicated the exceptions: "This does not mean that the city
does not have standing to raise other constitutional questions concerning
the statute attacked by them."78 The court in Spence proceeded to
illustrate the exceptions by considering city arguments on the constituproperty exemption as well as its requirement of tax
tion's public
7v
uniformity.

70. Id. at 541, 170 S.E. at 814. The municipality argued that the statute unconstitutionally distinguished between motor common carriers and all other carriers for hire. Id.
at 544, 170 S.E. at 815.
71. Id. at 544, 170 S.E. at 815.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 242 Ga. 194, 249 S.E.2d 554 (1978).
75. Id. at 195, 249 S.E.2d at 555. Pursuant to that statute, the county taxing officials
had assessed the municipality's property for ad valorem taxes. Id. at 194, 249 S.E.2d at
555.
76. Id. at 195-96, 249 S.E.2d at 556.
77. Id. at 195, 249 S.E.2d at 556.
78. Id. at 196, 249 S.E.2d at 556.
79. Id. at 196-97, 249 S.E.2d at 556-57. The court sustained the statute against both
constitutional attacks. Id. For further discussion of exceptions, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
When A Mother HurtsHer Young: Local Government ConstitutionalProtectionAgainst the
State, URBAN GA. MAG., May 1981, at 33, reprintedin R. PERRY SENELL, JR., ADDITIONAL
STUDIES IN GEORGIA LoCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 1 (1983).
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With the recorded triumph of the "plenary precept," early law took a
decisive first step in accommodating the tensions indigenous to the statelocal government relationship. The resulting "creature concept" stands
as a forceful reminder of historic conceptual confrontations. That
concept, in turn, also operates to strip the local government of "standing"
to raise due process and equal protection objections to perceived
mistreatment by the state. This legal incapacity, fashioned in both
federal and state spheres, represents yet another guiding star in the
constellation of local government law.
2. Recent Sighting. The historic principle could scarcely have been
catapulted into a more contemporary orbit than that touching society's
current controversial efforts to regulate firearms. The "no standing"
principle's appearance in that explosive context exemplifies in compelling
fashion local government law's penchant for conscripting ancient
concepts into modern service.
Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. City of Atlanta ° featured a classic power
standoff between city and state."1 Five days after the municipality filed
its action against gun manufacturers and providers, 2 the state
legislature enacted a general statute expressly prohibiting such suits.8 3
Additionally, the statute expressly declared its applicability to "any
action pending" on the statute's effective date." Defendant manufacturers and providers relied upon the explicit statutory prohibition. 5
In response, the municipality urged that prohibition to encroach upon its
vested rights in a retroactively unconstitutional fashion. 6 The city's

80. 253 Ga. App. 713, 560 S.E.2d 525 (2002).
81. Id. at 713, 560 S.E.2d at 527. The litigation itself was between the municipality
and gun manufacturers and providers, but defendants depended exclusively upon the state
statute, thus providing a direct conflict between the city's lawsuit and the state's
prohibitory enactment. Id.
82. The city maintained that the manufacturing and distribution of the guns was
foreseeably dangerous and alleged damages in being "forced to pay out large sums of
money to provide police and emergency services, police pension benefits and related
expenditures, as well as losing substantial tax revenues because of lost productivity." Id.
at 714, 560 S.E.2d at 527.
83. 1999 Ga. Laws 2; O.C.G.A. § 16-11-184 (1999). "The authority to bring suit and
right to recover against any firearms or ammunition manufacturers ... shall be reserved
exclusively to the state." Id. § 16-11-184(b)(2).
84. 1999 Ga. Laws 3. "This Act shall apply to any action pending on or brought on or
after the date this Act becomes effective." Id.
85. "The State and the gun manufacturers argue that the City's claims are also
prohibited under amended Code section 16-11-184." 253 Ga. App. at 719, 560 S.E.2d at
530.
86. Id. at 714, 716, 560 S.E.2d at 527-28. "The City argues that in spite of the clearly
expressed legislative intent, this Court may not apply the statute to bar the suit because
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argument thus exposed the venerable "creature concept" (and its "lack
of standing" appendage) to full frontal examination.
Reversing the trial court's refusal to dismiss the action, the Georgia
Court of Appeals adamantly rejected the municipality's argument of
unconstitutional retroactivity.8' Although retrospective statutes can
not "injuriously affect the vested rights of citizens,"8 the court delineated, "[m]unicipal corporations are not citizens." 9 Rather, "[a]s creations
of the State,"9 ° municipalities stand legally unprotected against state
legislative excesses. 9 ' As in the United States Supreme Court, so in
the Georgia Court of Appeals, the "plenary precept" continued its
dominating influence over those tensions characterizing the state-local
government relationship. 2 As the Georgia court decisively detonated
the standoff, "powers of home rule cities may be constitutionally and
retrospectively limited by the General Assembly."93
3. Reflection. It would be difficult to conceive of issues more
fundamental to American local government law than those recently
reflected by Sturm, Ruger & Co. Those issues savored, no less, of the
system's genesis: the fabled "creature concept," and its concomitant
appendages of "plenary power" and "lack of standing." Those principles
have served the ages in monitoring the tensions pervading the state-local

it would deprive the City of constitutional and vested rights." Id. at 720, 560 S.E.2d at
530-31.
87. Id. at 720, 560 S.E.2d at 530-31. The court initially held that the state expressly
preempted the field of firearms regulation. Id. at 717, 560 S.E.2d at 529. Next, the court
turned to the city's argument on unconstitutional retrospectivity. Id. at 720, 560 S.E.2d
at 530-31.
88. Id. at 720, 560 S.E.2d at 531. "We agree that the retroactive or retrospective
application of a statute is unconstitutional if it affects the vested rights of citizens ... but
we find no authority to support the City's contention that it has a vested right to pursue
this lawsuit." Id. (citation omitted).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. "'Municipal corporations are creations of the law.'" Id. (quoting Pierce v.
Powell, 188 Ga. 481, 484, 4 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1939)).
92. The court cited City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923). Id. at 720, 560
S.E.2d at 531.
93. Id. "[Tihe City's suit in this case 'is, in reality, an application of power which has
been prirparily entrusted to the state, and which the state may reclaim at its discretion."
Id. at 720-21, 560 S.E.2d at 531 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126
F. Supp. 2d 882, 892 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). "[T]he City's complaint and amended complaint
should have been dismissed in their entirety. No claims survive because of the legislature's
clear directive that municipalities may not attempt to regulate the gun industry in any way
except in the limited manner prescribed in [the general statutes]." Id. at 722, 560 S.E.2d
at 532.
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government relationship, and they anchor the subject's juristic orientation.
"Lack of standing," in particular, provides defining cast to the local
government's position in the process, as well as the point of departure
for appraising any modern legal crises. Itself arising from a doctrinal
standoff of historic proportions, the principle renders the local government defenseless against a domineering state. It found early service in
both the United States Supreme Court and the Georgia Supreme Court
to stymie local efforts at resistance. Under neither a federal nor a state
constitution, employing neither due process nor equal protection, could
a local government assert privileges or immunities against the state.
The inferior governmental entity (the "creature") suffered abject
subserviency to the superior entity (the "creator").
In its 2002 confrontation with Sturm, Ruger & Co., the Georgia Court
of Appeals boarded an analytical time machine. In a modern-to-theminute factual context, a context freighted with pressing political
intrigue, the court drew upon legal principles fashioned in a far different
environment. Although forged from historic philosophical standoffs, and
crafted by courts of non-clairvoyant perspectives, those principles
operated without pause across the ages. They operated to deny legal
"citizenship" to municipal corporations (even "home rule cities") and to
denigrate those entities as "creations of the State." So positioned, such
entities possessed no "vested rights" constitutionally protected from the
General Assembly's retroactive abolition.
Governmental problems, therefore, frequently change; governing
principles, however, often do not.
C.

Municipal Zoning of County Property

1.
Background. In 1926 the United States Supreme Court
sustained local government zoning as a constitutional exercise of the
police power. 4 Since that milepost, zoning has laid forceful claim to
centerpiece prominence in local government jurisprudence. In virtually
all jurisdictions, local governments have adopted ordinances classifying
the uses of property and restricting those uses to specified zones of
operation.
Zoning thus sets individual rights against community
collectivism in a fashion assuring the likelihood of litigation. More
intriguingly, it may also pit government against government.
A persistently recurring issue in the zoning litigation milieu queries
whether local government's land uses are themselves subject to local

94.

Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
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government's zoning restrictions.9 5 Specifically, when local government
proposes a land use at odds with a zoning ordinance, is the former
subservient to the latter? Over time, that issue has drawn considerable
attention from quarters both academic and judicial.
According to the authorities," courts have evolved a number of
"tests" to resolve the standoff between governmental land use and
governmental zoning prohibition. First, there is the "eminent domain"
test: If the local government possesses power to condemn the land, then
it may use the land in violation of the zoning ordinance. Second, there
is the "governmental-proprietary" test: Governmental uses are excepted
from zoning prohibitions and proprietary uses are not. Finally, there is
the "superior sovereign" test: The preference nod goes to the interest
(use or prohibition) deemed to savor of the higher sovereignty. About
these tests, the authorities appear generally to concur on two points.
First, courts typically employ the tests to excuse use from prohibition;
97
and second, they (both tests and courts) are wrong.
Rather, the writers maintain, courts should eschew conclusive tests
and revert instead to analyzing the proper order of governmental
priorities.9" The zoning prohibition encompasses the local government's
overriding concern with land utilization for the collective good; it
deserves prominence over a conflicting land use. When litigation arises,
a basic judicial presumption against the violation would force attention
to the broader (more deserving) concerns. In essence, the authorities
argue for a reversal of judicial approaches: Local government land use
should be subject to, not exempt from, local government zoning.
Two versions of the issue arrived before the Georgia Supreme Court
9
in 1954. In West v.Housing Authority of Atlanta,9 municipal citizens
challenged the housing authority's condemnation of land on grounds that
the proposed housing project did not conform to city zoning ordinances. 100 Brushing the challenge aside, the supreme court took its stand
in adamant fashion: "The fact that the property sought to be condemned

95. This brief description is drawn from R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government
Exposure to Local Government Zoning, 25 GA. ST. B.J. 180 (1989).
96. See, e.g., OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 414
(2d ed. 2001); James B. Sales, The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Governmental
Land Use, 39 TEx. L. REV. 316 (1961); George R. Wolff, The Inapplicability of Municipal
Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Uses, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 698 (1968);
Comment, Governmental Immunity From Local Zoning Ordinances,84 HARV. L. REV. 869
(1971). The following observations attempt a synthesis of the above materials.
97. See generally sources cited supra note 96.
98. See generally sources cited supra note 96.
99. 211 Ga. 133, 84 S.E.2d 30 (1954).
100. Id. at 135, 84 S.E.2d at 32.
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has not been zoned by the municipality for the use contemplated by the
Authority is not a valid ground or reason to enjoin the Authority from
proceeding with the project."" 1
The second case presented an even cleaner instance of the standoff.
Mayor of Savannah v. Collins1 0 2 featured an effort by municipal
homeowners to prevent the city's construction of a fire station on land
"zoned for other and different uses."' 0 3 Here, therefore, the land use
prohibited by municipal zoning ordinances was a use by the municipality
itself (rather than by an authority). Additionally, the municipality in
Collins had obtained the subject land by purchase (rather than by
eminent domain).'O°
Neither distinction mattered to the supreme
court:
Since a municipality unquestionably ...has the right to condemn
private property for a necessary governmental use, though it be located
in an area which has been zoned for other and different uses, it
necessarily follows that it may likewise use property for a necessary
governmental use which it has acquired previously by purchase. 5
Allowing the city's zoning power to prohibit the city's use of its property
"for a necessary governmental purpose," the court reasoned, "would
offend that provision of our Constitution which declares that the right
of eminent domain shall not be abridged.""°
Hoisting use over
prohibition, therefore, the supreme court's opinion in Collins conscripted
two analytical justifications: first, the city's power (not its actual
exercise) of eminent domain, and
second, the subject land's devotion to
"a necessary governmental use."10 7
Almost a decade later, Pearson v. County of TYift' 05 added a further
complication to the scenario-an additional local government. There, the
land use challenged as controverting municipal zoning was the county's
erection of a commercial building.'0 9 Once again, however, the distinction counted for naught. Drawing upon the county's creating local

101. Id. The court relied upon its decision almost thirty years earlier in Tift v. Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad, 161 Ga. 432, 131 S.E. 46 (1925), a case involving neither local
government land use nor local government zoning.
102. 211 Ga. 191, 84 S.E.2d 454 (1954).
103. Id.
104. Id., 84 S.E.2d at 454-55.
105. Id., 845 S.E.2d at 455.
106. Id. The court cited no Georgia authority. Id.
107. Id. In Collins, that "use" was for a fire station. Id.
108. 219 Ga. 254, 132 S.E.2d 710 (1963).
109. Id.
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statute, the supreme court found the power to erect "public buildings""' and presumed the county "to have acted within the scope of
[its] authority.""'
Under its prior decision in Collins, the court
asserted, "the county could either condemn property or use property it
owns for governmental purposes, even though such use violates a zoning
ordinance of a municipality in said county .... ,,112 Consequently, the
violation of city zoning could not stand as "a valid reason for enjoining
the county from using its property for governmental purposes." 3
With its rationale in Pearson, therefore, the court retained "eminent
domain" and "governmental purpose" as operative analytical facets and
completely ignored the complications introduced by dueling local
governments.
In following years, the court's decisions evidenced that county zoning
was to fare no better than municipal zoning against governmental land
use violations. In Evans v. Just Open Government,"4 the court held
that "property owned by the state for governmental purposes is immune
from [county] zoning ordinances."" 5 That was not the case, the court
delineated in Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v.Macon-Bibb County
Planning & Zoning Commission,"' for land used by "a nonprofit
corporation... even if the corporation is performing services which are
governmental in nature."" 7 Additionally, in Macon Ass'n the court
took note of the "tests" employed in other states for weighing zoning as
against governmental violation and expressly disapproved the "balancing-of-interests test.""1

110.

Id.

111. Id. The court refused to take judicial notice of what the county meant by its
allegation that the purpose of the building was "'an ASC Committee office.'" Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 242 Ga. 834, 251 S.E.2d 546 (1979).
115. Id. at 837-38, 251 S.E.2d at 549. The court thus rejected an action by county
citizens to prevent the location of state prisons in the county in violation of county zoning
ordinances. Id. at 838, 251 S.E.2d at 549-50.
116. 252 Ga. 484, 314 S.E.2d 218 (1984).
117. Id. at 490, 314 S.E.2d at 223. The court thus denied the corporation's petition for
exemption from the county's zoning prohibitions so that it might operate personal care
homes for the mentally retarded. Id. at 484, 314 S.E.2d at 219.
118. Id. at 490, 314 S.E.2d at 223. That test, the court asserted, was "too nebulous and
judicially unmanageable." Id. The court noted that "[iun Georgia, it has been held that
property owned by the state or county, and used for a governmental purpose, is exempt
from municipal zoning regulation, whether or not the property is acquired by eminent
domain or by bargain and sale." Id. at 489, 314 S.E.2d at 222.
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More recent cases directly pitted county zoning against county
violation. In Concerned Citizens v. Douglas County,"9 landowners
opposed the county's purchase and development of an adjoining tract as
a sanitary landfill. The landowners challenged the county zoning
ordinance's explicit exemption of the county from zoning and permit
requirements applicable to other applicants. 120 Rejecting the challenge, the court deemed it settled that "a county may use its property for
a necessary governmental use even though the property may be located
in an area which has been zoned for other and different uses."21
Finally, Board of Commissioners v. Chatham Advertisers122 featured
an effort by county commissioners to invalidate a contract by their
immediate predecessors, which permitted defendant to place benches
bearing advertising signs at various public locations. Plaintiffs charged
that the agreement violated a sign prohibition contained in the county
zoning ordinance. 123 Spurning the attack, the court restated its
familiar principle that "[a] county may use property it owns for a
necessary governmental purpose, even though such use violates a zoning
ordinance." 24 Moreover, the court insisted, the "grant of the right to
place these benches on public property, even with advertising on them,
was a use 'for a necessary governmental purpose.'' 125 In a footnote,
the court further elaborated as follows: "The use of 'governmental
purpose' in this [zoning] context embraces all aspects of governmental

119. 256 Ga. 82, 344 S.E.2d 641 (1986).
120. Id. at 82-83, 344 S.E.2d at 642-43. Those zoning requirements were applicable
only to privately operated landfills. Id. at 83, 344 S.E.2d at 642-43.
121. Id. at 83, 344 S.E.2d at 643. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's dismissal
of plaintiffs' complaint. Id. at 84, 344 S.E.2d at 850-51.
122. 258 Ga. 498, 371 S.E.2d 850 (1988).
123. Id. at 498-99, 371 S.E.2d at 850-51. Plaintiffs also attacked the contract as
violating the historic statutory prohibition against a governing authority binding itself or
its successors in matters of government. Id. at 499, 371 S.E.2d at 851; O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3
(2000). The court rejected that attack on grounds that the subject of the contract in issue
was a "proprietary or ministerial" matter and thus not covered by the prohibition. 258 Ga.
at 499, 371 S.E.2d at 851. For extended treatment of that statute and the evolving case
law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government and Contracts That Bind, 3 GA. L. REV.
546 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Binding Contracts in Georgia Local Goverment Law:
Recent Perspectives, 11 GA. ST. B.J. 148 (1975). Both articles are reprinted in R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 541, 579 (3d ed. 1977). See
also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Supreme Court and Local Government Law: Two
Sheets to the Wind, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361 (1999).
124. 258 Ga. at 499, 371 S.E.2d at 851.
125. Id. (quoting Juhan v. City of Lawrenceville, 251 Ga. 369, 306 S.E.2d 251 (1983)).
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functions, whether interpreted as governmental or as proprietary
(ministerial)." 2 6
2.

Recent Sighting. Against this background, there arose the

confrontation recently presented in City of Decatur v. DeKalb County. 127 There, the county sought to enjoin municipal enforcement of

"zoning, building, and other ordinances" against the county's construct128
ing a courthouse and renovating a building within the city limits.

Entirely receptive to the county's position, the trial judge characterized
all the subject ordinances as zoning measures 29 and reasoned as
follows:
"M]unicipal [zoning] ordinances do not control county
construction, where the county is performing an essential function of
government such as the construction, remodeling or modification of a
courthouse or court facilities." 3 0

For the trial judge, therefore, the

controversy unfolded a modern instance clearly controlled by a pivotal
principle of local government law.
Upon the city's appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged the
principle but immediately proceeded to confine its sphere of operation.' 3' The court specified that zoning ordinances, "'are those which
regulate by classifying property into separate districts.' 13 2 They must
be distinguished "'from other regulations with which a developer must
comply, such as requirements for a building permit.'' 133 Additionally,

126. Id. at 499 n.1. In this fashion, the court purported to distinguish its classification
of the contract as dealing with a "proprietary" function for purposes of precluding its
invalidation by the binding contracts prohibition of O.C.G.A. section 36-30-3. Id.
127. 256 Ga. App. 46, 567 S.E.2d 376 (2002). The case is not to be confused with City
of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 255 Ga. App. 868, 567 S.E.2d 332 (2002), the subject of yet
another "pivotal principle" analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 192-201.
128. 256 Ga. App. at 46, 567 S.E.2d at 377. The county had decided to build its new
courthouse and renovate a building on land that it owned within the municipality and had
proceeded to accept a contractor's bid to commence construction before obtaining any city
permits. Upon the city's "threats" to enforce its zoning and building ordinances, the county
sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 46-47, 567 S.E.2d at 377-78.

129. The trial court reasoned that "all of the ordinances that would necessarily apply
to the construction project (i.e., building codes for plumbing, electrical, heating and air
conditioning, sanitary sewer, storm water drainage, etc.) fell under the broad category of
,zoning.'" Id. at 47, 567 S.E.2d at 378.
130. Id. The court permanently enjoined the city from enforcing its ordinances. Id.
131. Id. at 47-48, 567 S.E.2d at 378.
132. Id. at 48, 567 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting Fairfax MK, Inc. v. City of Clarkston, 274 Ga.
520, 521, 555 S.E.2d 722, 724 (2001)).
133.

Id. (quoting Fairfax MK, 274 Ga. at 520, 555 S.E.2d at 723). The court noted that

"under the Georgia Constitution, municipal powers relating to 'zoning' are included in an
entirely separate section from supplementary municipal powers relating to the enforcement
of'[c]odes, including building, housing, plumbing, and electrical codes' and those involving

20
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the court instanced, "fire safety standards"'34 and "land-disturbing
activities"'3 5 are both areas "where the legislature has expressed an
intent for municipalities to have some authority to regulate the building
activities associated with county construction within [municipal]
boundaries." 3 6 Accordingly, the ordinances in controversy required
careful delineation, and the trial court had erred in holding that the
county "was not subject to regulation through any [city] ordinances."137
For the present, however, there could be no further appraisal in the
case, for the county had failed to introduce into evidence any of the
controverted ordinances.""8 Thus, the court could specify no precise
municipal regulations with which the county must comply.'39 The
most the court could offer was an identification of the measures to which
the county was immune: "The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that
county-owned property that is used for governmental purposes is not
subject to municipal zoning regulations." 4 ° Ironically, the court's only
cited authority was Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb
County Planning & Zoning Commission,' in which the supreme court

decided that "property owned by a nonprofit corporation is not immune
from local zoning regulations, even if the corporation is performing
services which are governmental in nature." 42 In any event, the court
expressly affirmed the trial judge's decision that the county's courthouse
and building "were not subject to [the city] zoning requirements."
3. Reflection. For better than a half-century, zoning litigation has
queried whether local government land use is subject to local government zoning. The writers, eschewing conclusive tests, respond with a

'[s]torm water and sewage collection and disposal systems.'" Id. at 48, 567 S.E.2d at 378.
The court cited GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 4 (zoning), and art. IX, § 2, para. 3(a)(6), (12)
(supplementary powers).
134. 256 Ga. App. at 48, 567 S.E.2d at 378-79. The court cited O.C.G;A. section 25-212(a)(1) (1981 & 2002 Supp.). Id., 567 S.E.2d at 379.
135. Id. at 49, 567 S.E.2d at 379. The court cited O.C.G.A. section 12-7-4 (2001). Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 47, 567 S.E.2d at 378.
141. Id. (citing Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 252 Ga. 484, 314 S.E.2d 218 (1984)); see also supra notes 95-97.
142. 252 Ga. at 490, 314 S.E.2d at 223.
143. Decatur,256 Ga. App. at 47, 567 S.E.2d at 378. "We hold that county government
building projects are not subject to city zoning regulations, but that they are subject to
other municipal regulation (as indicated by the Georgia legislature)." Id. at 46, 567 S.E.2d
at 377.
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presumptive "yes." The courts, adopting an assortment of tests, respond
with a presumptive "no." The Georgia Supreme Court eschews a
"balancing-of-interests" test and employs an analysis founded upon two
analytical facets: "eminent domain" and "governmental purpose."'
Both facets, however, assume a term-of-art countenance: "eminent
domain" can operate where there is no eminent domain,14 and "governmental purpose" overrides the traditional governmental-proprietary
dichotomy. 146 Ironies aside, the facets undergird a "pivotal principle"
of Georgia local government law: Local government land use trumps
local government zoning, and county land use trumps municipal
zoning. 47 As evidenced by the Georgia Court of Appeals in City of
Decatur, those adages hold firm in today's jurisprudence. 48
D.

Local Government Legislative Procedure

1. Background. As the government closest to the citizen, local
government constitutes that citizen's initial point of contact with
legislative law. The local government's legislative process bodes basic,
therefore, to the entity's effective operation.'49 It is through enactment
of ordinances, resolutions, and the like that the municipal or county
governing authority accomplishes what it must to serve its purpose for
being. When so engaged, this legislating body frequently functions
under predetermined forms of procedure. Those forms may appear in
statutes enacted by the General Assembly or in ordinances previously
adopted by the local government itself. On occasion, this point of
location assumes linchpin litigational significance.
The Georgia Supreme Court's most famous consideration of the matter
occurred in its 1929 decision of South Georgia Power Co. v. Baumann. 5 ' There, plaintiffs attacked the validity of a municipal franchise ordinance on grounds that it "was not read twice in accordance
with the provisions of an ordinance contained in the City Code."' 5' In
rejecting that position, the court drew a sharp distinction between
enactment requirements contained in "charter provisions" and those

144. Macon Ass'n, 252 Ga. at 488, 314 S.E.2d at 222.
145. Collins, 211 Ga. at 191, 84 S.E.2d at 455.
146. Chatham, 258 Ga. at 499, 371 S.E.2d at 851.
147. Id.
148. Decatur, 256 Ga. App. at 47, 567 S.E.2d at 378.
149. For extensive treatment of the subject, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Legislative
Process in Georgia Local Government Law, 5 GA. L. REV. 1 (1970), reprinted in R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 295 (3d ed. 1977).
150. 169 Ga. 649, 151 S.E. 513 (1929).
151. Id. at 651-52, 151 S.E. at 514.
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found in the city council's own "rules of order and proceeding." 152 The

former, "required by statute," are "mandatory," and "the courts have a
right to inquire whether they have been complied with."'53 The latter,
however, are mere "parliamentary rules" with which "the courts have no
concern," and may thus be "waived or disregarded by the [local
government's] legislative body."' 54 Accordingly, the municipal governing authority's violation of the two-reading ordinance could not be
employed to invalidate the franchise ordinance. 5'
With its analysis of South Georgia Power Co., the supreme court
relegated to a status of legal impotence legislative enactment requirements contained in municipal ordinances. As opposed to statutory
requirements, ordinance mandates stood only at the pleasure of the local
The authority's exercise of its pleasure in
governing authority. 5
ignoring those mandates claimed no part of the judiciary's concern.5 7
The governing body's discretion to adopt the procedures implied a like
discretion to change them, and violation constituted but a valid form of
change. 55 To require that the body expressly change the rule prior to
violating it held no legal appeal for the court. 5 9 Municipal citizens
and others dealing with the city would discover in due course that
ordinance rules of procedure applied only to them, not to the governing
body itself.
Two decades later, the supreme court perpetuated its statuteordinance delineation into the realm of county legislative process as well.
In Ellis v. Stokes, 6 ° the court focused upon a county rezoning ordinance adopted at a meeting held twenty-nine days after published

152. Id. at 655, 151 S.E. at 515.
153. Id.
154. Id.
"Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. So
Hence, where an
the council may abolish, modify or waive its own rules ....
ordinance is enacted in compliance with the charter, it will not be held void
because in its passage one of the parliamentary rules of the council was violated."
Id., 151 S.E. at 515-16 (quoting 2 EUGENE McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 1332
(1911)).
155. Id. at 655, 151 S.E. at 526. "So we are of the opinion that the grant of the
franchise by the mayor and council to the South Georgia Power Company can not be held
to be void, as insisted, because ... [it] was not read a second time before its passage. ..

Id.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id., 151 S.E.2d at 515.
Id., 151 S.E.2d at 515-16.
Id.
Id.
207 Ga. 423, 61 S.E.2d 806 (1950).
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notice. 6 ' A local statute required an interval of "at least 3 weeks"
between notice and meeting,' 62 and the court emphasized that "there
is no contention that the [29-day] period ...did not comply with the
statute."6 3 Additionally, however, a county ordinance required "a
lapse of 30 days" between notice and meeting.'s It was the commissioners' violation of this thirty-day mandate that the challengers
advanced to condemn the rezoning ordinance.'65 In rebuffing plaintiffs'
attack, the court drew liberally from its opinion in South GeorgiaPower
Co."6' 6 The lessons of that opinion coalesced to govern Ellis as follows:
"When the [county] commissioners fixed a period of 30 days after the
date of the notice, they did so as a rule of their own procedure, which
was subject to change at any time by them ... ."167 Indeed, the court
emphasized, "[t]he commissioners could set any time, so long as the
interval between the date of the notice and the date of the [meeting] was
at least 3 weeks."" s Accordingly, the court "[could] 1not
say that the
69
[rezoning] action of the commissioners was a nullity."
The supreme court's mid-century resolution of Ellis appeared to signal
the entrenched authority of two highly significant principles in the "law"
of local government legislation. Initially, the distinction between
statutory procedures and ordinance procedures loomed large. Any first
effort at appraising a charge of enactment deficiencies must identify the

161. Id. at 430, 61 S.E.2d at 810. The date of the notice of the meeting was given on
June 2, and the meeting was held on July 2. Challengers contended that only twenty-nine
days had elapsed, and the court conceded without deciding the correctness of the
contention. Id. at 426, 430, 61 S.E.2d at 807, 810.
162. Id. at 427, 61 S.E.2d at 808; 1939 Ga. Laws 584.
163. Ellis, 207 Ga. at 429, 61 S.E.2d at 809.
164. Id. This was an ordinance adopted in 1946 by the county commissioners, and the
contested rezoning meeting was held in 1947. Id. at 426, 61 S.E.2d at 808.
165. Id. at 427, 61 S.E.2d at 808.
166. Id. at 429-30, 61 S.E.2d at 810.
"Rules of procedure passed by one legislative body are not binding upon a
subsequent legislative body operating within the same jurisdiction. Courts
ordinarily will not invalidate an ordinance enacted in disregard of parliamentary
usage, provided the enactment is made in the manner provided by statute. A
municipal legislative body can not divest its successor of its legislative powers by
passing ordinances or resolutions which deprive their successor of the power to
exercise fully their legislative discretion. Charter provisions are structural, and
must be strictly complied with. 'Rules of parliamentary practice are merely
procedural, and not substantive.'"
Id. (quoting S. Ga. Power Co., 169 Ga. at 655, 151 S.E. at 515).
167. Id. at 429, 61 S.E.2d at 809.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 430, 61 S.E.2d at 810. At least, this was true, the court said, "in the
absence of a showing that the plaintiffs were misled to their hurt and injury." Id.
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precise location of the requirement allegedly violated. Second, the legal
irrelevance of requirements imposed by ordinance (or resolution)
assumed a position of impressive prominence. The municipal or county
governing authority could establish any procedural "rule" it wished
(within statutory bounds) and then proceed to "change" that rule at will.
Disconcertingly, the authority's outright violation of the requirement
sufficed as a legally sanctioned "change." Challengers of the violation,
in turn, received little solace by way of judicial recourse.
Two more decades elapsed before the court returned, in a fashion both
forceful and puzzling, to its disposition of Ellis. The occasion, Save the
Bay Committee v. Mayor & Council of Savannah,"7 presented yet
another protest against yet another rezoning ordinance.'17 In controversy over a proposed commercial development,'72 plaintiffs challenged
the ordinance's validity on a variety of grounds. 73 Procedurally, they
argued, the municipality enacted the measure in disregard of an
ordinance requiring both a five-day notice period and written notice to
adjoining landowners.' 74 That contention drew a judicial response
"For these
both conceding violation 75 and declaring the result:
reasons the action of the governing authority ... in rezoning the tract
was void." 7 ' As authority, the court asserted that it "[had] repeatedly
held that the notice requirements embodied in zoning ordinances ...
must be strictly complied with in any rezoning action taken by the
governing authorities of a municipality."177 As for reconciling this
decision with those in South Georgia Power Co. and Ellis, the court
ignored the former and condemned the latter: "If there be anything in
the case of Ellis v. Stokes ... contrary to that which we now rule, that
case, being less than a full-bench decision, must yield to earlier full17
bench decisions ....

170. 227 Ga. 436, 181 S.E.2d 351 (1971).
171. Id. at 439-42, 181 S.E.2d at 355-57.
172. Defendant developers proposed to erect an apartment complex in the disputed
area. Id. at 439, 181 S.E.2d at 355.
173. Id. at 438, 181 S.E.2d at 354. "The complaint ... alleges a number of violations
of the zoning ordinances of the City... in the rezoning proceeding." Id.
174. Id. at 447, 181 S.E.2d at 360.
175. Id. at 447-48, 181 S.E.2d at 360. "[Tihe record shows without dispute that the
publication was had only four days before the hearing," and "[iut is undisputed that [the
landowner] was not afforded the written notice to which she was entitled under the
ordinance." Id.
176. Id. at 448, 181 S.E.2d at 360.
177. Id. at 447, 181 S.E.2d at 360 (citing Jennings v. Suggs, 180 Ga. 141, 178 S.E. 282
(1935) and Atl. Ref. Co. v. Spears, 214 Ga. 126, 103 S.E.2d 547 (1958)).
178. Id. at 448, 181 S.E.2d at 360 (citing Jennings, 180 Ga. 141, 178 S.E. 282).
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As of 1971, therefore, the supreme court cast a pall of uncertainty over
a pivotal principle of local government legislative law. That principle-the fabled ineffectiveness of ordinance procedural requirements-appeared suddenly limited by the court's disposition of Save the
Bay Committee. Indeed, Save the Bay Committee did invalidate a
rezoning measure enacted in disregard of an ordinance imposing a
specified means of notice.17 9 Clearly, Ellis had refused to invalidate
a rezoning measure enacted contrary to such a requirement.' s Ellis,
the court announced in Save the Bay Committee, must "yield" to earlier
"full bench" decisions.'
However, those cited decisions, Jennings v.
Suggs182 and Atlantic Refining Co. v. Spears,'8' likewise involved (in
the most summary of contexts) noncompliance with ordinances mandating notice for the enactment of zoning measures.'" Did those decisions, as wielded by Save the Bay Committee, overrule Ellis only on their
common facts (ordinance notice requirements for zoning measures) or on
the far broader principle that Ellis had extracted from South Georgia
Power Co.? That is to ask, after Save the Bay Committee, did the local
government's violation of an ordinance procedural requirement (other
than a notice requirement for zoning) operate to invalidate the adopted
measure? That is to persist, did Save the Bay Committee overturn the
pivotal principle of South Georgia Power Co.? Because South Georgia
Power Co. dealt with neither notice nor zoning (but rather with an
ordinance imposing a three-reading requirement), and because South
Georgia Power Co. was an earlier "full-bench" decision than both
Jenningsand Atlantic Refining Co., and because Save the Bay Committee
conspicuously omitted any reference to South Georgia Power Co., the
inquiry was far from academic.
2. Recent Sighting. Precisely thirty years following the confusion
of Save the Bay Committee, the supreme court granted discretionary

179. Id.
180. 207 Ga. at 430, 61 S.E.2d at 810.
181. 227 Ga. at 448, 181 S.E.2d at 360.
182. 180 Ga. 141, 178 S.E. 282 (1935).
183. 214 Ga. 126, 103 S.E.2d 547 (1958).
184. Jennings, 180 Ga. at 142, 178 S.E. at 283;Atl. Ref Co., 214 Ga. at 128, 103 S.E.2d
at 548. In Jenningsthe municipality violated an ordinance requiring notice of the time and
place of the rezoning hearing, and the court summarily held that "[iun these circumstances,
and in view of the conflict in the evidence upon several points, the [lower] court properly
granted an interlocutory injunction" against operations under the rezoning measure. 180
Ga. at 142, 178 S.E. at 283. In Atlantic Refining Co., the court reasoned that "lu]nder the
ruling in Jennings... the purported [rezoning measure] (which was based solely on the
illegal and void notice given by the zoning commission), is without any legal force or effect."
214 Ga. at 128, 103 S.E.2d at 548.
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The
appeal in the case of Fairfax MK, Inc. v.City of Clarkston.'
court's 2001 disposition of the latter litigation dramatically revived
intriguing inquiries of yore. Once again, the law of local government
legislative process stood revealed as the crucial issue that it is. Once
again, the local government legislature's violation of its own procedures
called for judicial attention. Decades of doubt awaited the court's
answer to the call.
FairfaxMK featured a controversy resulting from municipal denial of
plaintiff's application for a service station permit. The city rested its
action on a provision of its "Gasoline Service Station Ordinance,"
requiring a minimum distance of 500 feet between service stations and
day care centers." 6 Plaintiffs in turn challenged that provision's
validity, charging its enactment in violation of an ordinance mandating
that "the order of business at City Council meetings be as specified on
the agenda prepared beforehand."8 7 Prior to considering that challenge, the supreme court first determined the service station ordinance
constituted an ordinance of regulation rather than zoning.18 With
that determination, the court crafted the case to analytically exciting
dimensions: The ordinance under attack constituted a regulatory
measure and not a zoning ordinance; 89 and the city's enactment of
that ordinance allegedly violated an agenda requirement and not a
notice mandate. 9 ° Did municipal violation of this ordinance procedural
requirement operate to invalidate the adopted regulatory measure? As
the issue materialized, realization dawned: It was the precise issue

185. 274 Ga. 520, 555 S.E.2d 722 (2001).
186. Id. at 520, 555 S.E.2d at 723.
187. Id. at 522, 555 S.E.2d at 724.
188. Id. at 521-22, 555 S.E.2d at 724. The court reached that conclusion in response
to challenger's contention that the ordinance violated the Zoning Procedures Law (O.C.G.A.
§§ 36-66-1 to 36-66-5 (2000)). Id. at 520-22, 555 S.E.2d at 723-24. The court said that
"'zoning ordinances' are those which 'regulate by classifying property into separate distrfits.'
Id. at 521, 555 S.E.2d at 724 (quoting City of Lilburn v. Sanchez, 268 Ga. 520, 521, 491
S.E.2d 353, 355 (1997)). The court asserted that plaintiffs
[W]ere not prevented from building a service station because of the property's
zoning. The City denied a building permit because the proposed facility would be
close to a day care center. The fact that a licensing ordinance somewhat concerns
location does not make it a zoning ordinance .... If a local ordinance applies to
a particular activity wherever it is carried out in the town and does not suspend
or limit the zoning ordinance, it "is not a zoning law merely because it touches the
use of land."
Id. at 521-22, 555 S.E.2d at 724 (quoting Town of Islip v. Zalak, 82 A.D.2d 83, 566 N.Y.S.2d
306, 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)). Accordingly, the court held that the Zoning Procedures
Law did not apply to the ordinance. Id. at 522, 555 S.E.2d at 724.
189. Id. at 521, 522, 555 S.E.2d at 724.
190. See id. at 522, 555 S.E.2d at 724-25.
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hauntedly hanging in daunting uncertainty for the past thirty years! To
what extent indeed had the pivotal principle of South Georgia Power Co.
"yielded" to the limiting vicissitudes of Save the Bay Committee?
The supreme court unanimously rejected plaintiff's procedural attack
on the service station ordinance but tendered dueling rationales. 9 '
First, the court observed, the record did not contain a copy of the agenda
ordinance which the city allegedly violated.' 92 That omission was
fatal, the court implied, because the "'appellate courts of this state do
not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance.'"' 9 3 Not satisfied to
conclude the matter on a purely technical note, however, the court then
elaborated an independent alternative analysis: "[A]lthough it is within
the province of courts to inquire into compliance with statutory charter
provisions, the observance of parliamentary and other procedural rules
enacted by a municipal corporation is not a matter of judicial concern."' 94 Even assuming the agenda ordinance properly before it, the
court thus implied, the city's alleged violation failed to draw judicial
condemnation of the service station ordinance. 9 ' As authority for this
second rationale, the court cited two of its prior decisions: 96 Ellis v.
Stokes and South Georgia Power Co. v. Baumann.
With the supreme court's disposition of Fairfax MK, law's continuity
was affirmed anew.
3. Reflection. From 1929 to 1971, it appeared settled that a local
government ordinance was not invalid although adopted in violation of
a prior procedural ordinance. First in South Georgia Power Co., and
again in Ellis, the Georgia Supreme Court relegated the matter to the
local government's complete discretion.'9 7 Unlike statutory procedures,

191. Fairfax MK, 274 Ga. at 522-23, 555 S.E.2d at 724.
192.
[Plaintiffs] also urge that the trial court erred in failing to strike the amendments
to the [Gasoline Service Station Ordinance] for noncompliance with the
requirement of [section] 2-26 of the City Code. They contend that that ordinance
provides that the order of business at City Council meetings be as specified on the
agenda prepared beforehand, but the record does not contain any copy of [section]
2-26.
Id. at 522, 555 S.E.2d at 724.
193. Id. (quoting Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 27, 486 S.E.2d 28, 29
(1997)).
194. Id., 555 S.E.2d at 725. This single sentence constituted the court's entire
treatment of the issue.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Ellis, 207 Ga. at 429, 61 S.E.2d at 809; S. Ga. Power Co., 169 Ga. at 655, 151 S.E.
at 515.
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ordinance mandates existed at the local legislature's pleasure and stood
subservient to violation ("change") at any time.
In 1971, however, the court in Save the Bay Committee invalidated a
rezoning measure enacted in violation of an ordinance's notice requirement. 9 ' There, the court omitted any reference to South Georgia
Power Co., advising only that Ellis must "yield" to the extent it was "contrary."99 Did the court's apparent reversal of position apply only to
notice requirements for zoning measures, the specific concerns of both
Save the Bay Committee and Ellis?
Perhaps, thirty years later, Fairfax MK has finally answered the
question. There, in a context involving neither notice nor zoning, the
court reverted to its historical position: it refused to invalidate an
ordinance presumably adopted in disregard of a prior ordinance's
procedural requirement. °° By its express and unqualified reliance
upon both South Georgia Power Co. and Ellis, the court may indeed have
limited Save the Bay Committee to its facts. If so, the "pivotal principle"
now stands in revised form: The local government's own rules of order
and proceeding, other than notice requirements regarding zoning, are
merely parliamentary, with which the courts have no concern, and may
be waived or disregarded by the local government's legislative body.
E. County Tax Disbursements to the Benefit of Municipalities
1. Background. The local government's power to tax largely
controls its power to spend or disburse." 1 Through Georgia's first six
constitutions, no distinction was drawn in this respect between
municipalities and counties. Rather, as authorized by the Constitution
of 1868, "t]he General Assembly may grant the power of taxation to
county authorities and municipal corporations, to be exercised within
their several territorial limits."20 2 Over the following years, however,
the legislature "had used this power very freely,"0 3 and "many coun-

198. Save the Bay Comm., 227 Ga. at 447-48, 181 S.E.2d at 360.
199. Id. at 448, 181 S.E.2d at 448.
200. Fairfax MK, 274 Ga. at 522, 555 S.E.2d at 724.
201. This brief description is drawn from two articles: R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The County
SpendingPower:An AbbreviatedAudit of the Account, 16 GA. L. REV. 599 (1982), reprinted
in R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., ADDITIONAL STUDIES IN GEORGIA LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW 231
(1983); and R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and the Constitution of 1983:
Selected Shorts, reprinted in ADDITIONAL STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOcAL GOVERNMENT LAW

565 (1983).
202. GA. CONST. of 1868, art. 1, § 28.
203. Adair v. Ellis, 83 Ga. 464, 467, 10 S.E. 117, 117 (1889).
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ties, cities and towns in the State were heavily in debt."2 °4 Concerns
with prevailing conditions yielded a constitutional convention determined to curtail existing extravagances. 0 5
The Georgia Constitution of 1877 contained a number of innovative
financial restrictions,0 6 including a prohibition aimed exclusively at
counties: "The General Assembly shall not have power to delegate to
any county the right to levy a tax for any purpose,"2 7 except for twelve
specifically enumerated subjects.0" Without counterpart for municipalities, this prohibition focused unique attention upon county taxing
and spending. To levy a tax, a county must possess a two-tier authorization: (1) there must be explicit statutory permission for the levy, and (2)
the object of the tax must be one specifically enumerated in the constitution. 2 9 Negative in thrust, forbidding in nature, and mandatory in
effect, the provision exuded the stringency of post-reconstruction
desperation.1 °
The 1877 constitutional prohibition provided impetus for a historic line
of decisions by the Georgia Supreme Court. 1 In case after case, the
court laid tax purpose beside constitutional enumeration and viewed
history to dictate literal interpretation. "Let us adhere to a strict
construction of the constitution," counseled the court, "at least so far as
taxing the people is concerned."2 12 Turning a deaf ear to arguments
of hardship and irrationality, the court assured that "these restrictions
which are now so much complained of will then be a shield to the
property-owners of the State, and a barrier against those who desire to

204. Id. at 467, 10 S.E. at 117.
205. See id. at 466-67, 10 S.E. at 117.
206. See id. at 466, 10 S.E. at 117.
The provision now under consideration, and several others in the present
constitution in regard to the taxing power, are new ones. No such restrictions as
are now contained in the constitution were ever before thrown around the
counties, cities and the legislature. It is a matter of public history that when the
convention met in the year 1877, the counties, towns and cities of the State were
largely in debt.
Id.
207. GA. CONST. of 1877, art. VII, § 6, para. 2.
208. Id., e.g., educational purposes, bridges, prisoners, jurors, litigation, quarantine,
roads, and courts. Id.
209. Id.
210.

See WALTER MCELREATH, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA 169

(1912).
211. See a full discussion of these cases in R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The County Spending
Power: An Abbreviated Audit of the Account, 16 GA. L. REV. 599, 601 (1982).
212. Adair, 83 Ga. at 470, 10 S.E. at 118.
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2 13
put their hands in the public treasury."
The court thus treated the
prohibition with utmost gravity, structuring whatever tests were
necessary to discover and thwart county violations. "Inasmuch as the
power of the counties to raise funds for public expenses is restricted to
these subject-matters, payments of such funds must necessarily be
restricted to the same subject-matters ... ."'
By the dawn of the
new century, therefore, the Georgia county's power to tax and spend
stood contained and constrained.
Over time, sporadic amendments added enumerated tax exceptions to
the constitutional prohibition, and these were included in the Constitution of 1945.215 Otherwise, that constitution forcefully perpetuated the
two-tier authorization as the pervading prerequisite for the Georgia
county's power to tax and spend. 16 The first indicated break with that
order occurred some twenty years later with the ratification of two 1966
constitutional amendments. One amendment affirmatively empowered
counties to tax for those purposes previously enumerated as exceptions
to the tax prohibition.2 17
The other amendment authorized the
General Assembly to delegate the county power of taxation for "such
other public purposes as may be authorized by the General Assembly."211 With these amendments, it appeared that the two-tier obstacle
to county taxation had been substantially leveled.
Not so. In 1979, City Council of Augusta v. Mangelly219 confronted
the supreme court with the constitutionality of the 1975 Local Option
Sales Tax Act. 220 There, the court adumbrated the "central issue" as
"whether the Georgia Constitution is violated by the Act's scheme of
allowing counties to tax and to distribute a portion of the tax proceeds
to cities." 221 Steadfastly retaining its historic restrictive approach, the
court first searched the tax authorizations enumerated in the 1966
constitutional amendment: "[T]axation by counties for the purpose of
sharing the resulting revenue with cities does not appear in that
list. " 222 The court was equally unyielding on the other amendment's
permission for the General Assembly to delegate the county tax power
for any "public purpose[] as may be authorized by the General Assem-

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Howard v. Early County, 104 Ga. 669, 671, 30 S.E. 880, 881 (1898).
GA. CONST. of 1945, art. VII, § 4, para. 1.
Id.
GA. CONST. of 1976, art. IX, § 5, para. 1.
GA. CONST. of 1976, art. IX, § 5, para. 2.
243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
Id. at 358-59, 254 S.E.2d at 317; 1975 Ga. Laws 984.
Mangelly, 243 Ga. at 360, 254 S.E.2d at 318.
Id. at 361, 254 S.E.2d at 318-19.

2003]

SOME PIVOTAL PRINCIPLES

31

bly."22 3 As the court adamantly insisted, "it can never be a valid
county purpose to provide revenue to a municipality, because municipaliof counties-they are an entirely
ties are not citizens of nor creatures
224
different form of government."

Given the intransigence of the Georgia Supreme Court on county
taxation, the Constitution of 1983 reflects intriguing policy changes.225
Foremost, that constitution declares, "the governing authority of any
county, municipality, or combination thereof may exercise the power 2of
26
taxation as authorized by this Constitution or by general law."
Reverting to the pre-1877 pattern, therefore, the present constitution
treats the tax power of municipalities and counties precisely the same.
Moreover, for the first time since 1877, the constitution contains no
specific list of enumerated subjects, either as exceptions or authorizaFinally, the 1983 constitution
tions, regarding county taxation.
expressly empowers local governments "to expend public funds to
or public function as authorized by this
perform any public service
227
Constitution or by law."

In summary, the history of a Georgia county's power to tax (and
spend) constitutes a saga of legal accommodation. The state's experience
with reconstruction nurtured an ingrained constitutional animosity to
governmental extravagance at the expense of property owners. Finding
exuberant acceptance in the supreme court, this mindset of constraint
held county taxation to centuries of rigid accountability. Even upon
signs of constitutional moderation, the court adamantly stayed its course
of limitation, taking particular umbrage at county tax disbursements to
municipalities. Providing revenue to noncitizen cities, the court
vigorously proclaimed, "can never be a valid county purpose."2 28
Whether this judicial sentiment could survive the subsequent taxliberating theme of the present constitution promised continued intrigue
on the subject of local government taxation.

223. Id. at 362, 254 S.E.2d at 319.
224. Id. Following this decision of unconstitutionality, the General Assembly reenacted
the local option sales tax statute in 1979, 1979 Ga. Laws 446, and the supreme court
sustained the enactment in Board of Commissioners v. Cooper, 245 Ga. 251, 260, 264
S.E.2d 193, 199-200 (1980). The court held that the statute was authorized by the constitution's "Supplementary Powers" provision of 1972. Id. at 253-54, 264 S.E.2d at 196; 1972
Ga. Laws 1551.
225. For a full discussion, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and the
Constitution of 1983: Selected Shorts, reprinted in R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., ADDITIONAL
STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 565 (1983).
226. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 4, para. 1.
227. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 4, para. 2.
228. Mangelly, 243 Ga. at 362, 254 S.E.2d at 319.
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2. Recent Sighting. Breaking a considerable period of silence on
the point, City of Decatur v. DeKalb County229 raised the historic issue
in the most modern of governmental contexts. There, county voters
approved the county levy of the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax
("HOST") statute. 230 That statute required that the resulting revenue
was to be used for a special district (whose boundaries were coterminous
with the county), that the proceeds be distributed to the county, and that
"a portion of such proceeds shall be expended for the purpose of funding
capital outlay projects."23 1 In arranging to distribute these latter funds
for capital outlay projects within the incorporated areas, the county
entered into the following agreement with several municipalities: "[The]
county ... shall disburse on an annual basis to each Municipality a
proportionate amount of [the tax funds] dedicated for capital outlay
projects."232 Subsequently, when dissatisfied with the amount of funds
received, several municipalities charged the county's breach of the
agreement. In response, the county denied the contract's validity, a
position accepted by the trial court, which granted the county's motion
for judgment on the pleadings.23 3
Upon de novo review, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.234 Initially, the court appraised the tax statute to
require that "the county bears the responsibility for expending the tax
proceeds for capital outlay projects." 235 By virtue of the intergovernmental agreement, the court asserted, the county "seeks to shift that
responsibility to the municipalities."236 In the absence of legislative
authority, "it is inappropriate for a county to simply give its tax revenue
to a municipality and allow that municipality to control what is done

229. 255 Ga. App. 868, 567 S.E.2d 332 (2002).
230. Id., 567 S.E.2d at 333; O.C.G.A. §§ 48-8-100 to 48-8-122 (2002).
231. 255 Ga. App. at 870, 567 S.E.2d at 334; O.C.G.A. § 48-8-104 (2002).
232. 255 Ga. App. at 869, 567 S.E.2d at 333. The local governments entered into this
agreement pursuant to the "Intergovernmental Agreement" authorization of the
constitution, art. IX, § 3, para. 1. Id. at 868, 567 S.E.2d at 333.
233. Id. at 869, 567 S.E.2d at 333.
234. Id. at 868, 567 S.E.2d at 333.
235. Id. at 870, 567 S.E.2d at 334. The court quoted the following provision of the
statute: "The sales and use tax levied pursuant to this article shall be exclusively
administered and collected by the commissioner for the use and benefit of each county
whose geographical boundary is coterminous with that of a special district." Id.; O.C.G.A.
§ 48-8-104.
236. 255 Ga. App. at 870, 567 S.E.2d at 334. "Contrary to the structure set forth in the
statute, the county has little power under the agreement to control what is done with the
tax proceeds once they are given to the municipalities." Id.
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with the revenue."237 For authority, the court quoted the supreme
court's famous language in Mangelly: "'[I]t can never be a valid county
purpose to provide [its tax] revenue to a municipality, because municipalities are not citizens of nor creatures of counties-they are an entirely
different form of government.'"23 8 That authority demanded an invalid
contract: "If the legislature had intended for counties to share HOST
proceeds with cities in the manner described
in the Intergovernmental
239

Agreement, it could have so stated."

3. Reflection. City of Decatur thus balanced one of local government's most modern taxing techniques against one of its most historic
constraints. In one corner, there appeared the local option sales tax,
local government's recently advanced alternative to increasing property
taxes. In the opposite corner, there emerged an agreement triggering
the law's traditional fears of unrestrained county tax disbursements.
Once again, the constraints prevailed.
Admittedly, the issue was no longer the ancient one of absolute
prohibition, for all acknowledge the liberating constitutional and
statutory changes of more recent times. At a minimum, however, the
court insisted that any effort to effect those changes be explicit, and was
prepared to subject such an effort to strictest scrutiny. In administering
that scrutiny, moreover, the court relied solely upon (indeed quoted) case
authority from the restrictive days of yore. Once the statute failed that

237. Id.
238. Id. (quotingMangelly, 243 Ga. at 362, 254 S.E.2d at 319). The court's citation was
as follows: "See City Council ofAugusta v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 362(1), (254 SE2d 315)
(1979) ... superceded by statute on other grounds as noted in Nielubowicz v. Chatham
County, 252 Ga. 330, n.1 (312 SE2d 802)." Id.
239. 255 Ga. App. at 870-71, 567 S.E.2d at 334. "The agreement here is contrary to the
express language of the HOST statute, is not authorized by law, and therefore cannot
stand." Id. at 871, 567 S.E.2d at 334.
As this Article went to press, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
decision. City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, No. S02G1617, 2003 WL 22532528 (Ga. Nov.
10, 2003). The supreme court by no means disagreed with local government law's historic
caution over county tax purposes, not with the correctness of the decision in City Council
of Augusta v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358 (1979). Rather, the supreme court held that the court
of appeals reliance on Mangelly had been "misplaced." Decatur, 2003 WL 22532528, at *1.
"The statute at issue in Mangelly was not enacted pursuant to the special district provision
of the Constitution, which is currently found at Article IX, Section II, Paragraph VI." Id.
The HOST statute was expressly based on that provision, the court reasoned, and thus
HOST "implements a district tax under the 'special district' Constitutional provision. It
does not violate Mangelly's proscriptions on county taxes, and the Court of Appeals erred
in so holding." Id. at *2. The statute thus authorized the intergovernmental contract
between the county and its municipalities. Accordingly, the supreme court's decision in no
way detracts from the historical significance of the "pivotal principle" under discussion.
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analysis, the county tax disbursement contract stood no chance of
success.
As it was in 1877, therefore, so it was in 1979; and as it was in 1979,
so it was in 2002.
III.

CONCLUSION

Justice Holmes's famous emphasis on case continuity finds striking
exemplification in the corpus of Georgia local government law. As the
legal order touching the citizen's first-stage exposure to the "government" experience, the subject takes only its origins from constitutional
and statutory outlines. The tailoring of those outlines to the uniqueness
of both citizen and government frequently occurs in litigation presented
to the appellate courts. The courts seek to resolve those controversies
in a manner encouraging the perception of judicial proficiency-an
assurance of orderly disposition.
In its recurring efforts at accommodation, the common law process
formulates principles sufficiently narrow to resolve the case at hand but
adequately broad to serve future variations. As those principles work
themselves into the legal fabric, they evidence a controlling presence
and, over time, assume the mantle of "pivotal principles."
Such
constructs are valuable: They provide a richer texture to the system and
afford an additional dimension for reflective appraisal. They encompass
law's historical component, thereby fostering an abiding sense of the
inevitable.
The effort here is one merely of illustration. It assembles litigational
episodes from five highly diverse areas across the expanse of Georgia
local government law. Each account features formulation of a pervading
legal principle and an abbreviated description of the precept's traditional
setting. Focus then shifts to the principle's judicial employment in
resolving the most modern of controversies.
Each of these new
millennium exercises captures a remarkably current vignette of
continuity. In mass, they attest in graphic fashion to the persistent
presence of the past in the likely law of the future.

